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How should, or could we choose between rationality on the one hand and
ethics or social justice on the other? Well, I don’t know. Fortunately we don’t
have to make this choice. But Jean-Pierre Schachter’s paper "Prudence,
Prejudice, and Fairness" appears to presuppose its necessity and, at least in
the situations he addresses, he appears to favour rationality over ethics and
social justice. But appearances can be deceiving.
Acting in accordance with our values is not irrational, or even imprudent. The
choices we face are not choices between reason and value but rather they are
choices between different values, and also choices between accounts of the
rationality of strategies for realizing them. Teasing out the values at play in
Schachter’s paper and then assessing the rationality of possible strategies for
achieving them would help us to appreciate the merits of his proposed solution
to the problem he outlines. This problem is the perceived conflict between the
prudential advantages of acting on certain kinds of information versus
prohibitions against using it on the grounds that this would be unfairly
prejudicial.
Schachter says that we tend to be more far more permissive about
incorporating prudential factors into our reasoning about non-humans than we
are about decision making that effects human beings, especially when the
effects might be negative. This is true insofar as we tend to be more cautious
in general about decision making that effects human beings.1 However, I’m
unconvinced that this caution always takes the form of rigid adherence to the
prohibitions upon which he focuses.
The prohibitions upon which Schachter focuses his attention concern
information related to characteristics typically included in anti-discrimination
human rights lists. One subject that leaps to mind when human rights are
mentioned is equal employment opportunities, so let’s start with it.
Here’s a hypothetical example. Sandy and Tony both apply for a job as a bylaw enforcement officer. Their stated qualifications and references indicate
they would be equally good by-law enforcement officers. So, there’s no rational
basis for preferring Sandy over Tony or vice versa. Neither has more claim on
the job than the other. Suppose we try to break the tie by introducing
information from the prohibited list. If there’s no reason to think this information
will help the employer determine who will likely be a better by-law enforcement
officer or that this information will help the employer achieve some other
reasonable objective,2 then it is irrational to appeal to these characteristics. It
is also harmful insofar as it violates the job candidates reasonable
expectations about being fairly dealt with.
Taking prohibited characteristics into account can be harmful in another way

when it reflects the social dominance of prejudices like racism, sexism and
homophobia. Sandy, who is a Cree lesbian, has no more and no less right to
the job than Tony who is a straight male third generation Canadian of Scottish
and Ukranian ancestry. But, if Tony gets the job and Sandy doesn’t due to the
aforementioned "prohibited characteristics", and if this is fairly typical decision
making in their society, Sandy is harmed in a way that she would not be
harmed if Tony got the job as a result of a coin toss.
Sandy is harmed by the systemic reduction of access, for people like her, to
the benefits available in her society. She is harmed by the reinforcement of the
general prejudices that make these harms less visible and she is harmed by
the cumulative effect of previous instances of prejudicial decision making. Acts
that result from prejudices like racism, sexism and homophobia are harmful not
simply because they involve treating a person as a member of a group rather
than as a unique individual, but because they involve treating members of
certain groups in ways that have consistently damaging effects.
This is why many people who are opposed to racism, sexism, homophobia
and so on, nonetheless support affirmative action. Affirmative action programs
benefit traditionally disadvantaged groups, without creating too onerous a
social burden for traditionally advantaged groups. If an affirmative action
program means the job goes to Sandy rather than Tony, even though Tony is
denied a benefit, he is not harmed in the way that Sandy and people like her
have long been harmed and continue to be harmed by widespread and
pervasive patterns of prejudice. Affirmative action programs simply are not
powerful enough to create the patterns of disbenefits among traditionally
advantaged groups that have persistently held for disadvantaged groups.
Of course, some opponents of racism, sexism, and homophobia also oppose
affirmative action, on the grounds that it is in the long run harmful to those it’s
supposed to benefit. Shelby Steele, for example argues, that such harms to
American Blacks, can be measured in terms of this group’s net decrease in
access to such benefits education, jobs and self-respect. The harms can also
be assessed, Steele argues, in terms of access to the benefits of living in a
society that values equality, justice and fairness. Steele believes affirmative
action programs do violence to these values, discouraging rather than
encouraging individual and institutional respect for them. For American Blacks,
a group that has long suffered inequality, injustice and unfairness, this is a
serious criticism of affirmative action.3 If Steele is right about the effects of
affirmative action, support for its use of information in the prohibited category
is irrational and for American Blacks imprudent.
Consideration of these kinds for and against affirmative action lead to the
following two points. First, Schachter is right to suggest that the "prohibited
characteristics" have been so strongly associated with injustice that among
people who oppose injustice, the mere mention of them has come to seem
taboo. Taboos are typically associated with superstitious and irrational
decision making. If that were all that our nervousness about appealing to the so

called prohibited characteristics were about, then Schachter would be right to
urge us to get over it. On the other hand, what looks like avoidance of taboos
may just be wariness and caution. If this attitude is warranted, then we ought to
pay attention to our wariness and proceed cautiously when we reconsider the
value of incorporating prohibited information into our decision making.
To proceed cautiously, we must get clear about both the methods and
objectives of our decision making. Getting clear about our objectives means
being as explicit and articulate as possible about the values that ought to be
factored into our decision making and which will be manifested in the
decisions we make. Getting clear about our methods involves recognizing that
it is precisely in terms of the aforementioned values that the rationality or
prudence of our decisions must be assessed. They are intrinsic to rational and
prudent decision making processes. They are not independently competing
considerations.
The affirmative action arguments I have mentioned, both pro and con, illustrate
my second point: In evaluating the wisdom of reasoning with "prohibited
characteristics" we must consider distinct kinds of consequences. Towards the
end of his paper, Schachter alludes to contrasting types of consequences:
those identified in terms of their impact on the interests of the individual versus
those that affect the interests of the state. I fear, however, that this contrast may
indicate a too narrowly circumscribed view of what is in an individual’s
interests.
We can describe, more broadly the contrast I think Schachter’s argument
needs, in terms of long term versus immediate costs and benefits. We can
also describe it in terms of how well our interests are served by the outcome of
a particular isolated act as opposed to how well our interests are served by
social policies, rules, laws or mores that in general legitimate acts of this sort.
Thus, while taking "prohibited characteristics" into consideration, strictly in the
context of an isolated case, may seem prudent, de-regulating this kind of
decision making more generally may not be so prudent. It may mean that
individuals (including particular benefited individuals) are made more
vulnerable to the risks of living in a society that is not built on respect for things
like fairness, equality and justice.4
It would be useful to have more details regarding the kinds of situations in
which Schachter believes it would be wisest to appeal to the so-called
prohibited characteristics. Then we could better assess the merits of his
recommendations in terms of their longer term consequences and assess their
more general impact on the kind of society in which we wish to live.
The relevant details might be drawn from examples like those drawn from
following three categories: decision making involving the potential for adults to
harm children; medical diagnoses and treatment plans; and the search for the
object of our heart’s desire.
Decision making involving potential harms to children presents us with a raft of

examples that are worth a second look. As Schachter points out, we think it is
O.K. to advise our children to be wary of strangers whom we regard as
potential threats, no matter how circumstantial the evidence. We do this
because the potential harm to the child is so grave. Moreover, it is weighed
against a something that is considerably less important, namely, whether
someone’s feelings are hurt by being shunned by a child. We have a right and
obligation to protect children, while strangers do not have a right to the
affection of children.
We often go even further in taking into account potentially damning
circumstantial evidence when children’s safety is at stake. For example, a
person who is merely suspected and not convicted of child abuse may have his
name placed on the provincial child abuse registry, and then be denied access
to any paid or volunteer employment that gives him access to children. Again,
as a society, we think that the potential harms to children outweigh the potential
harms to persons seeking certain kinds of paid or volunteer work. This
suggests that we do not think a person has an unlimited right to such work.
On the other hand, we take a much dimmer view of attempts to introduce
circumstantial evidence into criminal prosecutions of child abuse. The stakes
for children remain as high as they were in the other cases, but in the criminal
case the stakes for the accused have risen dramatically. Criminal conviction,
which may result in incarceration, and which for convicted child abusers would
mean incarceration in pretty grim conditions, is such a serious consequence
that we change the rules about the kind of evidence we regard as permissible.
This is a reflection of our belief in the importance of fairness in the criminal
court. We uphold this principle even for people suspected of child abuse,
because we believe that for the rest of us, maintaining access to justice
depends on it. While we may be willing to live in a society in which we risk
being unfairly shunned by wary children, and we may be willing to risk being
denied a job as a daycare worker after being unfairly added to the child abuse
registry, most of us are not willing to risk false imprisonment resulting from an
unfair criminal conviction for child abuse.
Medical practice is another source of examples of socially sanctioned decision
making that incorporates information about prohibited characteristics.
Physicians commonly use information about sex, age, sexual practices, and
racial designation in the course of reasoning towards diagnostic conclusions
and treatment recommendations.
It is tempting to suppose that we tolerate this because doctors are engaged in
scientific reasoning which as such it is not vulnerable to the sort of bias that
makes us wary about other more socially or politically charged reasoning.5
This is tempting, but mistaken. The reason that we are willing to permit such
appeals is that we do not believe we have equal rights to every medically
possible diagnostic test or treatment.
Medical resources are limited and we believe that they ought to be distributed
after careful consideration of the value of the test or treatment, based on the

likelihood that a patient has a particular condition and will benefit from a
particular treatment. We tolerate consideration of the prohibited characteristics
here because we believe that there is a scientifically demonstrated relationship
between them and the usefulness of certain tests and treatments. For example,
although breast cancer is not unheard of among men or among young women,
women are at far greater risk than men, and women’s risk increases with age.
Thus, routine mammogram breast cancer screening programs for women over
50 are in place in many communities.
Insofar as the science that supports this is good science, and insofar as we
are morally and politically prepared to accept the risks of epidemiologically
based selective distribution of health care resources, appeal to the prohibited
characteristics is a good, fair and rational thing. Nonetheless, we should
perhaps be more cautious about accepting many medical appeals to the
prohibited characteristics. It is not that there is something inherently wrong or
taboo about these appeals, but there is evidence that rather a lot of scientific
research has been tainted by the same old widespread social prejudices that
motivate our general wariness about the prohibited characteristics. For
example, researchers are just now discovering how scientifically weak
widespread medical assumptions about women and cardiovascular disease
are.6
As a final example of a case in which it is socially acceptable to seek and
provide information of the prohibited characteristics sort, I cite the personals.
These advertisements soliciting sexual and affectional companions seem to
do nothing but appeal to the prohibited characteristics. When an acquaintance
of mine tried to place an ad in a local newspaper she found herself having to
interact with an automated system. It could not cope with her request to publish
a message of her own composition that would communicate what she sought
in a lover and what she was willing to bring to a relationship. Instead she found
herself obliged to categorize herself and the imagined object of her desires
almost exclusively in terms of age, race, sex, height, and weight, with hobbies
and habits tacked on at the end. This is a sad statement about the
contemporary commodification of desire but it is not a violation of any taboo
related to the characteristics Schachter calls prohibited. Indeed it indicates just
how untaboo these considerations are in at least some contexts.
Whether there is a deeper problem with appeal to such characteristics in this
sort of situation is open for discussion, I think. But, if, on balance, it is best to
have access to such information, then we must ask why and what other sorts of
situations are sufficiently like this one to warrant permitting rather than
prohibiting prejudice.
Endnotes
1When comparing harms and benefits to humans versus non-humans,
however, we do not always favour humans, at least not in an uncomplicated

way. Schachter's comments about pit-bulls notwithstanding, we are sometimes
more likely to benefit a non-human than a human. Many of us are more likely to
take home and care for a stray animal than a needy street person.
2It can of course be argued that under some circumstances information about
"prohibited characteristics" can be counted as relevant to job performance.
Such arguments have been made in the context of affirmative action. See for
example Bernard Boxill's Blacks and Social Justice. (Rowman and Littlefield,
1984). For an account of how taking into account "prohibited characteristics"
can serve broader reasonable objectives such as dismantling systems of
racial oppression, see Richard Wasserstrom's "One Way to Understand and
Defend Programs of Preferential Treatment" in The Moral Foundations of Civil
Rights, ed. Robert Fullinwider and Claudia Mills (Rowman and Littlefield,
1986).
3Shelby Steele. The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in
America. (New York:, St. Martin's Press, 1990).
4This contrast could be described as a methodological one of the sort that
distinguishes rule utilitarianism from act utilitarianism. Or, if you don't like
utilitarianism, you could account for the rationality of social policy by appeal to
the sort of rational individual decision making that, in A Theory of Justice, John
Rawls hypothesizes would occur "behind the veil of ignorance". And, someone
who is committed to a deontological account of individual rights would argue
that it is irrational to encourage people to engage in and act on decisionmaking that would tend to undermine individual and institutional respect for
rights, even if it is advantageous for an individual in a particular instance.
5In actual fact this view of the objectivity of science may play a role in uncritical
public attitudes to medical demands for and use of all sorts of information. My
point should really be expressed by saying that this is not the best reason we
have for permitting doctors to incorporate information about prohibited
characteristics into their decision making.
6For further details on the way in which relationships between issues of class,
race, gender, scientifically bad medical research and the unfair distribution of
health care resources, see Susan Sherwin's No Longer Patient: Feminist
Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).

